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THE LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD NOT DIE: A CASE STUDY IN
THE DIFFICULTY OF GREENING THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
by
Lawrence Zelenak∗
Congress and the Treasury have commissioned the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) “to undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to identify the types of and specific tax provisions
that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions
and to estimate the magnitude of those effects.” The hope of the
proponents of the NAS carbon audit is that Congress, once informed of
the results of the audit, will respond by “greening” the Internal Revenue
Code. This Essay cautions that a more environmentally friendly Code
will not necessarily follow from the legislative consciousness-raising of the
carbon audit. It offers the story of the “SUV loophole” as a case study in
the difficulty of removing environmentally offensive provisions from the
tax laws, even when Congress is well aware of the existence of those
provisions.
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INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF GREENING THE CODE

In 2008 Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to: “enter
into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] to
undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
∗
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to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest
effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate
1
the magnitude of those effects.” The legislation called for the NAS to
submit its report (carbon audit) to Congress by October 4, 2010, but the
$1.5 million required to fund the study was not appropriated until
2
December 2009. The report is now not expected until late 2011. The
hope of the proponents of the carbon audit, of course, is that once the
NAS has highlighted “the potential for changes in the tax code to reduce
3
carbon emissions,” Congress will respond by “greening” the Internal
Revenue Code.
The carbon audit is certainly a worthwhile project. Some of the ways
in which the current tax laws may contribute to global warming are far
4
from obvious, and making Congress aware of such non-obvious effects is
a necessary first step in persuading Congress to amend the Code to
alleviate those effects. I am sure, however, that the proponents of the
carbon audit are under no illusions that the greening of the Code will
follow readily once Congress’s consciousness has been raised by the NAS
study. My own view is pessimistic; I doubt if any Code provisions that
encourage the emission of greenhouse gases will be repealed in the
aftermath of the carbon audit.
In support of that view, this Essay offers—as a case study in the
difficulty of removing environmentally offensive tax breaks from the
Code—the story of the “SUV loophole.” Most taxpayers who buy
expensive vehicles for business use are subject to strict limitations on
their allowable cost-recovery deductions, but a small business owner who
buys a sport utility vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000
pounds (making it environmentally objectionable even relative to other
1

Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 117,
122 Stat. 3807, 3831 (2008). I have previously offered the NAS my unsolicited advice
as to how it should select Code provisions for inclusion in the carbon audit. See
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Expenditures and the Carbon Audit, 122 TAX NOTES 1367 (2009)
(proposing that the NAS include in the audit any existing tax provision satisfying two
criteria: (1) that there is a technically and politically plausible alternative to the
current provision, and (2) that the current provision and the alternative to it would
have significantly different effects on greenhouse gas emissions).
2
See § 117, 122 Stat. at 3831; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-117, § 4, 123 Stat. 3034, 3159 (2009).
3
Press Release, Earl Blumenauer, Reps. Blumenauer, McDermott, and Neal
Highlight House Passage of New Direction Energy Policy (May 20, 2008), available at
http://blumenauer.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1322.
4
For example, the home mortgage interest deduction may encourage suburban
sprawl, which leads to longer commutes in single-occupant vehicles, which leads to
increased carbon dioxide emissions. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on
the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1347, 1370–71 (2000); Richard Voith, Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the
Pattern of Metropolitan Development?, BUS. REV., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 3, 3–6.
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5

SUVs) may immediately deduct $25,000 of its cost under the small
6
business expensing rules of section 179 of the Code. A business taxpayer
paying $60,000 in 2011 for a new Cadillac sedan could claim a first-year
7
cost-recovery deduction of $11,060. But if the taxpayer instead bought—
at the same price and in the same year—a new Cadillac Escalade SUV
(gross vehicle weight 7,300 pounds), he would be able to deduct the
8
entire $60,000 cost in 2011. These 2011 results are affected by the
temporary “bonus depreciation” rules of section 168(k). Under the
permanent rules (that is, in the absence of section 168(k)), a taxpayer
9
buying a sedan would be entitled to a first-year deduction of only $3,060,
and a taxpayer buying an SUV would be entitled to a first-year deduction
of $32,000—$25,000 under section 179 and another $7,000 derived by
the application of the cost-recovery rules of section 168 to the remaining
10
$35,000 of the cost of the vehicle.
Although the SUV loophole is neither the most economically
significant nor the most environmentally damaging of the Internal
Revenue Code’s offenses against the environment, it is among the most
transparent and the most outrageous. Whether viewed from the
perspective of tax policy, energy policy, or environmental policy, it is
11
simply and obviously indefensible. Consider tax policy first. The
limitations on deductions for the business use of luxury automobiles
(imposed by section 280F) are designed to avoid “subsidiz[ing] the
element of personal consumption associated with the use of very
12
expensive automobiles.” The personal consumption element inherent
in the Escalade is every bit as significant as the personal consumption
element inherent in the sedan, yet the tax system does nothing to avoid
subsidizing that consumption. As for energy policy: At a time when
reducing the United States’ dependence on foreign oil is widely viewed

5

See infra Part II.A.
I.R.C. § 179 (2006).
7
Rev. Proc. 2011-21, 2011-12 I.R.B. 560, 561 tbl.1 (March 21, 2011); I.R.C.
§ 168(k)(2)(F)(i).
8
He could either (1) deduct $25,000 under section 179 and the remaining
$35,000 under section 168(k)(5), or (2) simply deduct the entire $60,000 under
section 168(k)(5).
9
Rev. Proc. 2011-21, supra note 7, at 562 tbl.3.
10
See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. at 696 tbl.1.
11
One of the best policy critiques of the SUV loophole appeared several year ago
in these pages. See Carrie M. Dupic, The SUV Tax Loophole: Today’s Quintessential
Suburban Passenger Vehicle Becomes Small Businesses’ Quintessential Tax Break, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 669 (2005).
12
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 599 (1984).
6

Do Not Delete

472

4/15/2011 1:29 PM

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

13

[Vol. 15:2

14

as a matter of national security, the tax subsidy for low-mileage SUVs
encourages increased dependence on foreign-source energy. The effects
of large SUVs on global warming are straightforward. Burning gasoline
produces the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, and low-mileage vehicles
produce more carbon dioxide per mile than more fuel-efficient vehicles.
On a scale of zero (worst) to ten (best), the Environmental Protection
15
Agency gives the Escalade a “greenhouse gas score” of three. For
comparison, a Cadillac CTS sedan (with a six-cylinder engine and semi16
automatic transmission) has a score of six.
In addition to being indefensible on the merits, the SUV loophole
would seem to have little going for it politically. The loophole owes its
existence to a historical accident, rather than to a legislative decision to
17
subsidize purchasers of SUVs. It is difficult to imagine a tax provision
better suited to generating outrage among the general public. The
provision itself is easily understood, the objections to it are obvious and
visceral, and once outrage has been generated it can be rekindled by
every sighting of a large SUV. The loophole was thoroughly exposed and
18
derided by the national media as early as 2002; the George W. Bush
19
administration publicly favored its repeal; the Alliance of Automobile
20
Manufacturers made no attempt to defend it; and a number of
21
legislators targeted it for repeal. And yet, even with the stars seemingly
perfectly aligned for its repeal, the SUV deduction survives. Commenting
in 2002 on the possible repeal of the SUV loophole, Dan Becker, the
director of the Sierra Club’s global-warming and energy program,
demonstrated both prescience and a capacity for understatement by
noting that “tax breaks are typically tough to erase once they are on the
22
books.” If Congress has not seen fit to repeal the tax subsidy for
purchasers of large SUVs, how likely is it that other provisions—

13

See Richard N. Haass, Foreward to COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY, at xi–xii (Indep. Task Force Rep.
No. 58, 2006).
14
The Environmental Protection Agency estimates the Escalade’s mileage at 14
miles per gallon city, and 20 miles per gallon highway. The EPA’s mileage estimates
for all new vehicle models are available at THE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SOURCE FOR
FUEL ECONOMY INFORMATION, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/.
15
GREEN VEHICLE GUIDE, http://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/Index.do.
16
Id.
17
See infra Part II.A.
18
See infra Part II.B.
19
See infra text accompanying note 66.
20
See infra text accompanying note 67.
21
See infra text accompanying note 46.
22
Jeffrey Ball & Karen Lundegaard, Tax Breaks for the Merely Affluent: Quirk in Law
Lets Some SUV Drivers Take Big Deduction, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at D1.
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seemingly far less politically vulnerable than this one—will be repealed in
response to the carbon audit of the Internal Revenue Code?
II. THE STORY OF THE SUV LOOPHOLE
A. A Loophole is Born
Congress enacted the section 280F restrictions on depreciation
23
deductions for “luxury automobiles” in 1984. The restrictions did not
apply, however, to any vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of more than
24
6,000 pounds. Qualifying for the exception produced two benefits. First,
the taxpayer could use the usual accelerated cost-recovery rules of section
168, rather than being relegated to delayed cost recovery under section
25
280F. Second, a small business taxpayer could claim an immediate
26
deduction under section 179 for up to $5,000 of the cost of the vehicle.
The exception was self-evidently based on the congressional assumption
that a taxpayer’s choice of a vehicle weighing more than three tons would
be based solely on business concerns; no one would derive personal
consumption benefits from such a behemoth. As of 1984, that
assumption was basically correct. The first SUV—in the modern sense of
a vehicle designed for, and marketed to, suburban families as an
alternative to a car—was the 1984 Jeep Cherokee (introduced in late
27
28
1983). Its gross vehicle weight was 4,629 pounds. At the time the
luxury automobile deduction restrictions were enacted, there was no carsubstitute SUV with a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 pounds. In
the absence of such a vehicle, Congress was right to assume that the use
of a vehicle weighing more than 6,000 pounds would be based on
business needs, rather than on personal preferences.
That assumption was eventually undermined by changes in the tastes
of the American driving public. The SUV as an alternative to a car surged
in popularity in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. In 1975, large
SUVs constituted only 0.1% of all new light-duty vehicles sold in the
United States; the market share of large SUVs rose to 0.5% by 1988, and
23

Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 179, 98 Stat. 494, 713
(1984).
24
The current version of the exception, which applies to any “truck or van” with
a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 pounds, is codified at I.R.C.
§ 280F(d)(5)(A) (2006).
25
See § 179, 98 Stat. at 713.
26
See id. § 13, at 505.
27
KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: SUVS—THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS
VEHICLES AND HOW THEY GOT THAT WAY 37, 40 (2002).
28
Tori Tellem, 1984–1988 Jeep Cherokee/Wagoner XJ: Killing off Jeep’s Biggest Success,
MAGAZINE,
Feb.
2009,
http://www.jpmagazine.com/featuredvehicles
JP
/154_0609_1984_to_1988_jeep_cherokee_and_wagoner/index.html.
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29

skyrocketed to 11.8% by 2006. Over the same period that the large SUV
was becoming the personal-use vehicle of choice for many drivers,
Congress was increasing the tax advantage of the exemption from the
luxury automobile deduction restrictions. The maximum deduction
30
under section 179 reached $24,000 in 2002, and $25,000 in 2003.
B. The Loophole Thrives on Exposure
The SUV deduction remained a bit of tax arcana, known only to a
limited number of small business owners and their accountants, until a
31
story appeared in the December 18, 2002 edition of the Detroit News.
The story described a healthcare consultant, Karl Wizinsky, who bought a
Ford Excursion for $47,000 and claimed a deduction for $32,000 of the
purchase price; he explained that he chose the Excursion “because it was
32
a pretty hefty deduction.” The story noted the tension between the SUV
deduction and “other national goals, such as . . . reducing U.S.
33
dependence on foreign oil and cutting greenhouse gasses.” The story
cited Taxpayers for Common Sense (a self-described “independent and
34
non-partisan voice for taxpayers”) for its estimate that the deduction
cost the Treasury “between $840 million and $987 million for every
35
100,000 [deduction-eligible] vehicles sold to businesses.” It noted that
38 models of light trucks (a classification covering vans and pickups, in
addition to SUVs) were heavy enough to qualify for the tax break, and
36
that 3.8 million light trucks had been sold in 2001.
The national media quickly picked up the story. Within the next few
days, stories describing and criticizing the SUV deduction appeared in
the Wall Street Journal (noting that “a tax break that was at least partly
intended to help farmers buy pickup trucks is now being applied to
37
today’s quintessential suburban passenger vehicle”), the New York Times
(describing three internists sharing a practice, each of whom had
purchased a deduction-eligible SUV, and quoting the remark of a
spokesperson for an environmental organization that “Congress needs to
29
ROBERT M. HEAVENRICH, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-R-06-011, LIGHT-DUTY
AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND FUEL ECONOMY TRENDS: 1975 THROUGH 2006, at 21
(2006).
30
Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1111(a), 110
Stat. 1755, 1758 (1996).
31
Jeff Plungis, SUV, Truck Owners Get a Big Tax Break: Loophole Allows Hefty WriteOff for Vehicles, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18, 2002, at C1.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, http://www.taxpayer.net/.
35
Plungis, supra note 31, at C1.
36
Id.
37
Ball & Lundegaard, supra note 22, at D1.
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38

step up and close this loophole”), National Public Radio (interviewing a
spokesperson for Taxpayers for Common Sense, who favored the repeal
39
of the deduction), and ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings
(featuring the reporter’s observation, “[a]t a time when the nation’s
priorities are to improve gas mileage and reduce dependence on foreign
oil, the government has instead provided an incentive for just the
40
opposite, the biggest, least efficient SUVs available”). A Los Angeles Times
editorial advocated repeal of the SUV loophole “[t]o rein in the wasteful
41
symbolism of this law.”
In early January 2003, a columnist for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution
described the SUV deduction as “[s]ound[ing] too good to be true,” and
predicted its imminent demise: “So if you’re planning to take advantage
42
of this deal, do it soon. I don’t think it will be around much longer.” It
seemed a reasonable prediction at the time, but it could not have been
more wrong. A few days earlier, President Bush had proposed tripling the
43
section 179 deduction ceiling, from $25,000 to $75,000. Nothing in the
President’s proposal was SUV-specific—it applied to all section 179eligible assets, and there is no indication that he was thumbing his nose
at the critics of the SUV deduction—but enactment of the proposal
would have hugely increased the existing tax preference for large SUVs
over cars and smaller SUVs. It did not take the Detroit News long to call
44
attention to that aspect of the proposal with a front-page story. The
story quoted the reaction of an excited Hummer dealer—either
engaging in hyperbole or displaying an imperfect understanding of the
effect of a tax deduction—“Oh, you’ve got to be kidding . . . . That would
45
make a Hummer practically free.” Senator Barbara Boxer quickly
leaped into the fray, introducing a bill (co-sponsored by Senators Hillary
Clinton and Charles Schumer) to subject SUVs weighing over 6,000

38
Danny Hakim, In Tax Twist, Big Vehicles Get the Bigger Deductions, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2002, at C1 (quoting one of the internists, “I have one partner who just did it
with a Suburban”).
39
Interview by Bob Edwards with Aileen Roder of Taxpayers for Common Sense,
A Tax Loophole that Allows Business Owners to Depreciate SUVs More Quickly than Cars
(NPR radio broadcast Dec. 26, 2002).
40
SUV Loophole Benefits Wealthy, (ABC World News Tonight broadcast Dec. 27,
2002) (transcript on file with the Lewis & Clark Law Review).
41
Loopholes as Big as an SUV, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at Cal. Metro 22.
42
Clark Howard, Jump on Giant ‘SUV Tax Break’ While You Can, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Jan. 9, 2003, at 3NW.
43
Excerpts from Bush’s Speech on His Proposal to Stimulate the Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2003, at A14.
44
See Jeff Plungis, SUV Tax Break May Reach $75K: Environmentalists Bash Bush
Plan, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 20, 2003, at A1.
45
Id.
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46

pounds to the luxury automobile deduction restrictions. According to
the Detroit News, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that Senator
Boxer’s proposal would increase federal tax revenues by almost $1.3
47
billion over ten years.
The Washington Post reported that, according to an unnamed “senior
Republican tax aide,” the Senate was interested in closing the SUV
48
loophole. Although the tax bill passed by the Senate did not repeal the
SUV deduction, the aide indicated that the loophole had “slipped
through as the Senate hurried to pass a bill,” and that the Senate
negotiators in the conference committee would push for repeal of the
49
deduction. They must not have pushed hard enough, however, because
the SUV deduction was intact when the bill emerged from the
50
conference committee. The President’s section 179 proposal fared
much better, with Congress one-upping the President. Instead of tripling
the section 179 ceiling to $75,000, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003 quadrupled the ceiling to $100,000 (for 2003,
51
2004, and 2005).
Automobile manufacturers took the tax break into account in
designing their vehicles. A spokesman for General Motors told the Wall
Street Journal that Cadillac responded to dealer complaints about the
gross vehicle weight of its SRX model by having its engineers “re-evaluate
52
the vehicle’s capabilities so that it would qualify for the tax break.” The
Washington Post reported a car dealer’s observation that many new SUV
models were just over 6,000 pounds, and his suspicion that “automakers
53
have their eyes on the tax code.”

46
Barbara Boxer, Boxer Bill Would Limit Depreciation of SUVs, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Feb. 13, 2003, available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 30-126; Edward Epstein, 2 Senators Seek
Controls on Gas-Guzzling SUVs: Plans by Boxer, Feinstein Face Uphill Battle, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 30, 2003, at A2.
47
Jeff Plungis, SUV Tax Break May Grow: Loophole that Small-Business Owners Use to
Buy Trucks Expected to Jump to $100,000, DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2003, at B1.
48
Jonathan Weisman, President Supports House Tax Bill: Move Seen as Effort to Speed
Measure, WASH. POST, May 21, 2003, at A1.
49
Id.
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 108-126 (2003) (Conf. Rep.).
51
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§ 202, 117 Stat. 752, 757.
52
Neal E. Boudette & Karen Lundegaard, SUV Tax Break for Businesses is Likely to
End, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2004, at D6. After the engineers’ tinkering, the 2004 SRX
model had a gross vehicle weight of 6,008 pounds. 2004 Cadillac SRX, CARS.COM,
http://www.cars.com/cadillac/srx/2004/specs/.
53
Jonathan Weisman, Businesses Jump on an SUV Loophole; Suddenly $100,000 Tax
Deduction Proves a Marketing Bonanza, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A1.

Do Not Delete

2011]

4/15/2011 1:29 PM

THE LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD NOT DIE

477

C. The Status Quo Ante Restored
Opponents of the SUV deduction were quick to criticize its
quadrupling. According to the Wall Street Journal, critics claimed the
enhanced deduction was “inconsistent with the Bush administration’s
54
avowed commitment to reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil.” The
Los Angeles Times editorialized: “It’s bad enough that giant SUVs guzzle
gas and pollute the air. Congress should halt the ridiculous practice of
55
the government paying people to buy them.” Commenting on the
widespread criticism, Automotive News noted that one would never guess
from the news coverage that the revenue cost of the enhanced SUV
deduction was less than 0.5% of the tax legislation’s total revenue
reduction: “If news stories were a proper gauge, we would have to
conclude that the most important provision of the giant tax-cut bill that
President Bush signed last week was what the reformers call ‘the SUV
56
loophole’ or ‘the Hummer deduction.’”
The clamor appeared to have some effect on the Senate. In October
2003 the Senate Finance Committee voted to re-impose a $25,000 ceiling
on the section 179 deduction for SUVs (while retaining the $100,000
57
section 179 ceiling for all other assets). The Committee explained its
rationale for reducing the ceiling:
[T]he Committee understands that some taxpayers are using
section 179 to lower the cost of purchasing certain types of vehicles
(1) that are not subject to the luxury automobile limitations
imposed by Congress and (2) for which the specific features of such
vehicle are not necessary for purposes of conducting the taxpayer’s
business. The Committee is concerned about such market
distortions and does not believe that the United States taxpayers
58
should subsidize a portion of such purchase.
Senator Boxer remarked that she would prefer “clos[ing] the SUV
loophole entirely,” but that she was “at least relieved that the Committee
59
acted to repeal the expansion of the loophole enacted earlier this year.”
60
House negotiators rejected the Senate’s loophole-tightening provision,
54

Stephen Power, A Tax Break as Big as a Big SUV, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003, at

D2.
55

A Hummer-Sized Loophole, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at Cal. Metro 14.
Harry Stoffer, SUV Passions Overflow in Tax Debate, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 2,
2003, at 14.
57
Rob Wells, Personal Finance—Tax Report: SUV Write-Off Goes Into Reverse, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at D2.
58
S. REP. NO. 108-192, at 195 (2003).
59
Wells, supra note 57.
60
Richard Simon, Energy Bill Could Pass House Today; Republicans Pack the Measure
with State Perks as Cost Estimates of Tax Breaks Reach $23 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2003, at A14.
56
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however, and as 2003 ended the $100,000 deduction ceiling remained in
the Code. Sales figures suggested small business owners were responsive
to the tax incentive. Dealers sold more than 101,000 full-sized and luxury
61
SUVs in January 2004, a 51% increase over sales in January 2003.
Strong sentiment for reeling in the deduction persisted in the
Senate. During the October 2004 House-Senate negotiations on the
American Jobs Creation Act, Senator Don Nickles—an Oklahoma
Republican about to retire from the Senate—offered an amendment to
reduce the SUV deduction under section 179 to $25,000 (while retaining
62
the $100,000 ceiling for other assets, including vans and pickup trucks).
Senator Nickles had been “converted” on the issue by his car-dealer son,
63
who called the $100,000 SUV deduction a “rip-off.” According to the
Washington Post, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas
64
“mocked [Nickles’] proposal” —unfortunately, the story provided no
details on the nature of the mockery—but the amendment eventually
65
prevailed in conference and became law. The amendment’s cause was
presumably aided by a letter from Treasury Secretary John Snow
indicating that “[t]he Administration supports complete elimination of
the ‘SUV tax loophole,’ except for cases where there is a demonstrated
66
legitimate business need for a large Sport Utility Vehicle.” The Alliance
of Automobile Manufacturers did not object to Nickles’ amendment
(although its spokesman indicated it would have preferred eliminating
the tax disparity between SUVs and other vehicles by making all vehicles
67
eligible for the $100,000 ceiling). The Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated that tightening of the loophole would increase revenues by
68
$137 million in 2005 and $136 million in 2006.
Among those who had opposed the $100,000 deduction ceiling,
opinions differed as to whether reducing the ceiling to $25,000 solved
the problem. Keith Ashdown of Taxpayers for Common Sense claimed
69
that “[t]his fixes what is probably the biggest outrage in the tax code.”
61

Jim Hopkins, SUV Sales Climb on Tax Loophole, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2004, at 3B.
Dustin Stamper, Luxury SUV Loophole Curbed in ETI Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Oct.15, 2004, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT 200-3.
63
James Toedtman, Closing $100G Loophole, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 2004, at A46.
64
Jonathan Weisman, Tobacco Rider Adds Fire to Debate over Corporate Tax Bill:
Buyout, Regulation Keys in Latest Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A4.
65
See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 910, 118 Stat.
1418, 1659 (2004).
66
John Snow, Snow Shares Administration’s Views on ETI Repeal Bill with Top
Taxwriters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2004, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT 194-19.
67
Harry Stoffer, Tax Bill Losses Outnumber Wins: Congress Cuts Tax Credits for
Hybrids, Fuel Cells, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004, at 8.
68
Stamper, supra note 62.
69
Jeff Plungis, Bill Curbs SUV Tax Write-Off: The Break for Small-Business Owners is
Trimmed to $25,000 instead of $100,000, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1B.
62
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His statement was somewhat surprising, in light of the fact that two years
earlier, when the SUV deduction ceiling had been $25,000, his
organization had strenuously called for complete repeal of the tax
70
favoritism for large SUVs. Senator John McCain remarked on the floor
of the Senate that the SUV tax break “is not as bad as it used to be, but it
71
is still too expensive and should be eliminated.” National Public Radio
commentator Connie Rice included “The Fat SUV Tax Break
Preservation Provision” on her list of the “Top 10 Outrages of the
72
Corporate Tax Bill.”
Other than some news coverage of taxpayers buying SUVs in
73
December 2004 —to take advantage of the $100,000 deduction ceiling
before it expired—the SUV deduction has attracted little attention from
the media since October 2004. Some members of Congress have
continued to press for the elimination of the deduction, but without
success. In a reversal of the situation in 2003 and 2004—when the House
(with a Republican majority) was the obstacle to legislation to reduce or
eliminate the deduction—in 2007 and 2008, the House (with a
Democratic majority) passed bills repealing the deduction, but the
Senate failed to act. Complete repeal of the SUV deduction was included
in a renewable energy and energy conservation bill passed by the House
in August 2007, but the Bush White House threatened a veto (not
74
because of the SUV provision) and the bill died in the Senate. The
House passed a very similar renewable energy and energy conservation
bill—also featuring complete repeal of the SUV deduction—in February
2008, but the White House again promised a veto and the bill again died
75
in the Senate.
III. CONCLUSION
In many ways, the SUV deduction seemed especially vulnerable to
repeal. It had originated as an accidental subsidy. It favored a product
that was disliked and resented by many Americans. It managed
70
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2007)(passage of H.R. 2776); White House, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, White House
Threatens Veto of House Energy Bills, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 6, 2007, available at LEXIS
2007 TNT 151-61.
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simultaneously to constitute bad tax policy, bad energy policy, and bad
environmental policy, in ways easily understood by the general public. It
received extensive negative media coverage. The Bush administration
(which seldom met a tax break it did not like) favored its repeal, and
automobile manufacturers made no attempt to defend it. If Congress has
not managed to repeal the SUV deduction, it seems unlikely that the
results of the carbon audit will inspire Congress to repeal other—
seemingly less vulnerable—environmentally damaging provisions of the
federal tax code.
On the other hand, the increase in the section 179 ceiling from
$25,000 to $100,000 may have worked strongly in favor of the deduction’s
survival. The public outcry over the deduction seemed to demand some
legislative response, and in the absence of the increase in the ceiling, the
only obvious response would have been elimination of the loophole.
Given the ceiling increase, however, Congress could satisfy the demand
for some sort of action merely by returning the loophole to its original
$25,000 level. Those with short memories—including, apparently,
Taxpayers for Common Sense—would not recall that less than two years
earlier they had been outraged by a $25,000 section 179 deduction for a
76
large SUV. Perhaps the Duke of York (“he marched them up to the top
of the hill and marched them down again”) aspect of the story was crucial
to the deduction’s survival. If so, the story may tell us little about the
likely fate of other environmentally objectionable provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. One might also point out, as an additional
reason for optimism, that Congress did manage in 2008 to modestly
reduce tax deductions for the oil and gas industry, thus proving that
77
reductions in anti-green tax subsidies are not absolutely impossible.
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The satisfaction of Taxpayers for Common Sense with the return of the
loophole to its original (and previously objectionable) size is reminiscent of the
Yiddish folk tale about the man who asks his rabbi for help with the overcrowding
problem in his house. The rabbi tells the man to move his farm animals into the
house. This, of course, only makes the problem worse. When the rabbi later tells the
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man with the overcrowded house.
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Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 401–
02, 122 Stat. 3807, 3851–54 (2008) (limiting the domestic production activities
deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, and revising the foreign
tax credit rules applicable to foreign oil and gas income). See J. COMM. ON TAXATION,
110TH CONG. ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE “ENERGY IMPROVEMENT AND
EXTENSION ACT OF 2008,” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE SENATE FLOOR ON
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Do Not Delete

2011]

4/15/2011 1:29 PM

THE LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD NOT DIE

481

I am not wholly persuaded by the case for optimism. Despite the
unusual Duke of York aspect of the SUV provision, it is hard to escape
the conclusion that, all things considered, the SUV loophole was about as
politically vulnerable as any anti-green tax break is ever likely to be. If
that conclusion is correct, then the prospects for the greening of the
Internal Revenue Code are not good. Part of the problem is a mindset,
shared by a significant number of members of Congress, that tax
increases are always bad, and that any closing of a loophole—no matter
how unjustified the loophole may be—is a tax increase and thus must be
78
resisted. Of course, political conditions are always changing, and (as the
investment advisors say) past performance is no guarantee of future
results. Increasing political concerns about budget deficits may make
closing the loophole more attractive in the next few years than it was in
the previous decade. Perhaps conditions in the not-too-distant future will
be favorable for not only the repeal of the SUV loophole, but for the
repeal of many other non-green tax provisions as well. One can always
hope.
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